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Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton Review: A Landmark Work in Analytic Aesthetics
Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts is a major work of analytic philosophy of art, originally published by Harvard University Press in 1990 and later issued in a reprint paperback edition. By grounding the theory of representation in the logic of children's make-believe, Walton constructs a unified framework that spans literature, painting, sculpture, theater, and film — making it essential reading for philosophers of art, aestheticians, and theorists of fiction.
LuvemBooks Verdict
Best for
Philosophers and advanced graduate students working in analytic aesthetics, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of language who need a rigorous, unified theoretical account of representation across the arts.
Worth it if
You are prepared to engage with dense, systematically argued analytic philosophy and want a single framework that addresses fiction, depiction, the ontology of fictional entities, and emotional response to art in one coherent sweep.
Skip if
You are a general reader, an undergraduate new to philosophy of art, or a humanities scholar (in film studies, literary theory, or art history) who is not yet comfortable with analytic methodology and its highly technical vocabulary — the investment required to unlock the payoffs is substantial.
What readers & critics say
David Novitz, writing in Philosophy and Literature (as summarised on muse.jhu.edu), describes the theory as bearing "all the refinement and subtlety of argument that analytic philosophy can muster," noting that Walton's aim is to explore and explain the foundations of the representational arts. First Person Scholar notes the broad applicability of the make-believe framework, observing that it opens productive new lenses even beyond the arts Walton explicitly addresses.
Sources: muse.jhu.edu (Philosophy and Literature, David Novitz), firstpersonscholar.comLook inside the book
Preview the actual pages, via Google BooksIn This Review
- What Works & What Doesn't
- What the Book Actually Argues
- Scope and Ambition Across the Arts
- Philosophical Precision and a Distinctive Technical Vocabulary
- Significance in the Field
- Who This Book Is For
What Works & What Doesn't
What Works
- Constructs a unified theory of representation spanning literature, painting, sculpture, theater, and film from a single, coherent foundational analogy
- Addresses a broad range of fundamental questions — fiction vs. Nonfiction, depiction vs. Description, ontology of fictional entities — within one framework
- Walton's careful, explicit management of his own technical vocabulary reduces the ambiguity common in aesthetics
- Published and kept in print by Harvard University Press, reflecting its sustained standing as a reference point in analytic aesthetics
What Doesn't
- Walton's highly technical use of terms like 'representation' diverges from ordinary usage in ways that require significant investment from readers outside analytic philosophy
- The book's density and systematic argumentation make it unsuitable as an entry point for general readers or students new to philosophy of art
A foundational work in analytic aesthetics, Mimesis as Make-Believe builds a sweeping, unified theory of representation from a single, deceptively simple analogy: that artworks function as props in games of make-believe, much as a child's tree stump becomes a bear in imaginative play.
Mimesis and Make-Believe by Walton front cover
What the Book Actually Argues
Walton's central project, as the Harvard University Press description states, is to "explore and explain the foundations of the representational arts." His theory holds that representations — in fiction, painting, sculpture, theater, and film — find their origin not in everyday documentary life but in make-believe, and that they function "first and foremost as props in games of make-believe," as David Novitz summarized the argument in Philosophy and Literature. From this single anchoring claim, Walton builds outward to address a remarkably broad set of questions: what distinguishes fiction from nonfiction, how depiction differs from description, what "point of view" means in the arts, and what it means for one work to be more "realistic" than another. The theory also extends to tackle the long-contested philosophical problem of the ontological standing of fictitious beings — what it means, philosophically, for Sherlock Holmes or Anna Karenina to "exist" — and what statements referring to such entities actually mean.
“both more broadly and more narrowly than is ordinarily done, and that only fiction will qualify as”
Scope and Ambition Across the Arts
One of the book's most distinctive features is the range of art forms it draws into a single theoretical orbit. Rather than treating literature, visual art, and performance as separate domains requiring separate accounts, Walton deploys his make-believe framework across all of them, illustrating his theoretical positions with examples drawn from literature, painting, sculpture, theater, and film. This cross-media scope is integral to the book's argument: the claim is that the make-believe model illuminates representation as such, not merely one corner of it. The publisher's description positions the book as essential reading for "everyone interested in the workings of representational art," a framing that reflects just how broadly Walton casts the net.
Philosophical Precision and a Distinctive Technical Vocabulary
Walton is notably precise about his own terminology — a precision that both strengthens and, for some readers, complicates the work. As Novitz's review in Philosophy and Literature records, Walton explicitly signals at the outset that he uses the term "representation" both more broadly and more narrowly than is ordinarily done, and that only fiction will qualify as "representational" in his particular technical sense. This careful boundary-setting is characteristic of the book's approach: rather than borrowing ordinary language and hoping for the best, Walton builds a technical apparatus from the ground up. Readers coming from philosophy will find this rigor familiar and valuable; readers from art history, film studies, or literary theory who are less accustomed to analytic methodology may need to invest time in mastering Walton's framework before the payoffs become visible.
Significance in the Field
First published in 1990 and reissued in paperback by Harvard University Press, the book has held a sustained presence in philosophical aesthetics for more than three decades. The fact that Harvard University Press has kept it in print in a reprint edition attests to its continued assignment in graduate philosophy courses and its status as a reference point in ongoing debates about fiction, depiction, and emotional response to art. The make-believe theory Walton develops here has become one of the most discussed proposals in analytic philosophy of art, influencing debates about what it means to have genuine emotional responses to characters one knows to be fictional — a problem sometimes called the "paradox of fiction."
Who This Book Is For
Mimesis as Make-Believe is scholarly philosophy — dense, systematically argued, and written for readers prepared to engage with extended analytical argument. Philosophers working in aesthetics, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of language will find it indispensable. Theorists in adjacent fields — film studies, literary theory, art history — who want a rigorous analytic account of representation will find it rewarding but demanding. The book is not designed as an introduction to aesthetics for a general audience; it presupposes comfort with philosophical argumentation and rewards careful, patient reading. For the audience it addresses, however, Walton's construction of a unified theory of the representational arts from a single, elegantly simple premise represents the kind of philosophical achievement that defines a field.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is Mimesis and Make-Believe written for?
The book is written for a scholarly audience — philosophers working in aesthetics, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of language will find it indispensable. Theorists in adjacent fields such as film studies, literary theory, and art history will find it rewarding but demanding, as it presupposes comfort with extended philosophical argumentation and is not designed as an introduction for a general audience.
What is the central argument of Mimesis and Make-Believe?
Walton's central argument is that representations in fiction, painting, sculpture, theater, and film find their origin in make-believe, and that artworks function first and foremost as props in games of make-believe — much as a child's tree stump becomes a bear in imaginative play. From this single anchoring claim, he builds outward to address questions about fiction, depiction, point of view in the arts, and the ontological standing of fictional beings like Sherlock Holmes or Anna Karenina.
What philosophical problems does Walton tackle in this book?
Walton addresses a remarkably broad set of problems, including what distinguishes fiction from nonfiction, how depiction differs from description, what point of view means in the arts, and what it means for one work to be more realistic than another. He also tackles the long-contested problem of the ontological standing of fictitious beings and the paradox of fiction — what it means to have genuine emotional responses to characters one knows to be fictional.
What is the make-believe analogy Walton uses?
Walton uses the analogy that artworks function as props in games of make-believe, drawing a parallel to how a child's tree stump becomes a bear in imaginative play. This deceptively simple analogy serves as the foundation for his entire unified theory of representation across all the representational arts.
Does the book cover multiple art forms or focus on one?
One of the book's most distinctive features is the range of art forms it brings into a single theoretical orbit — literature, painting, sculpture, theater, and film are all addressed. Rather than treating each art form as requiring a separate account, Walton deploys his make-believe framework across all of them, arguing that the model illuminates representation as such, not merely one corner of it.
How technically demanding is the writing in this book?
The book is notably precise about its own terminology, with Walton building a technical apparatus from the ground up rather than relying on ordinary language. Readers from philosophy will find this rigor familiar and valuable, but readers from art history, film studies, or literary theory who are less accustomed to analytic methodology may need to invest significant time in mastering Walton's framework before the payoffs become visible.
Is this book accessible to non-philosophers?
Mimesis and Make-Believe is not designed as an introduction to aesthetics for a general audience and presupposes comfort with philosophical argumentation. Theorists in adjacent fields who want a rigorous analytic account of representation will find it rewarding but demanding, and the reviewer recommends patient, careful reading as the key to unlocking its insights.
How does Walton define representation in the book?
Walton explicitly signals at the outset that he uses the term representation both more broadly and more narrowly than is ordinarily done, and that only fiction will qualify as representational in his particular technical sense. This careful boundary-setting is characteristic of the book's approach, where he constructs a precise technical vocabulary rather than borrowing ordinary language.
What is the paradox of fiction and does this book address it?
The paradox of fiction refers to the philosophical problem of what it means to have genuine emotional responses to characters one knows to be fictional. Walton's make-believe theory has become one of the most discussed proposals in this area of analytic philosophy of art, and addressing this problem is identified in the review as one of the key contributions of the book.
How significant is this book in the field of aesthetics?
First published in 1990 and reissued in paperback by Harvard University Press, the book has held a sustained presence in philosophical aesthetics for more than three decades. The make-believe theory Walton develops has become one of the most discussed proposals in analytic philosophy of art, and the book continues to be assigned in graduate philosophy courses and serves as a reference point in ongoing debates about fiction, depiction, and emotional response to art.
Is Mimesis and Make-Believe still in print?
Yes, the book was first published in 1990 and has been reissued in paperback by Harvard University Press in a reprint edition. The fact that Harvard University Press has kept it in print attests to its continued use in graduate philosophy courses and its status as a foundational reference point in philosophical aesthetics.
What makes this book a landmark in analytic aesthetics?
The review describes it as a foundational work in analytic aesthetics that constructs a unified theory of the representational arts from a single, elegantly simple premise. For the audience it addresses, this represents the kind of philosophical achievement that defines a field, bringing together fiction, visual art, and performance under one coherent theoretical framework.
What does the book say about fictional beings like Sherlock Holmes?
Walton uses his make-believe theory to address the long-contested philosophical problem of the ontological standing of fictitious beings — what it means, philosophically, for characters like Sherlock Holmes or Anna Karenina to exist. He also engages with what statements referring to such entities actually mean, treating this as one of the central puzzles his unified theory is equipped to resolve.
How is the book structured as an argument?
The book builds systematically outward from a single anchoring claim — that artworks function as props in games of make-believe — to address an increasingly broad set of philosophical questions about representation across all the arts. The reviewer characterizes it as densely and systematically argued, rewarding careful and patient reading rather than offering quick takeaways.
What will readers from film studies or literary theory get out of this book?
Theorists in film studies, literary theory, and art history who want a rigorous analytic account of representation will find the book rewarding, though demanding. They may need to invest time in mastering Walton's technical vocabulary and framework before the payoffs become visible, particularly if they are less accustomed to analytic philosophical methodology.
What are the main limitations or caveats about this book?
The book's primary limitation is its accessibility: it is dense, systematically argued, and written for readers already comfortable with philosophical argumentation, making it unsuitable for general audiences or casual readers. Additionally, Walton's use of the term representation in a specialized technical sense — more broadly and more narrowly than ordinary usage — requires readers to set aside familiar meanings and learn his framework on its own terms.
Is Mimesis and Make-Believe worth reading for philosophers?
The reviewer describes it as indispensable for philosophers working in aesthetics, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of language. For the audience it addresses, Walton's construction of a unified theory from a single elegant premise represents the kind of philosophical achievement that defines a field, and its more than three decades of continued influence in the discipline underscore that assessment.
What practical insights does this book offer about how art works?
Walton's theory offers a framework for understanding how representation functions across all the arts — why artworks engage the imagination the way they do, how fiction differs from nonfiction, and how depiction differs from description. Rather than offering applied or practical tips, the book provides a rigorous theoretical account that reframes how one thinks about the mechanics of artistic representation at a foundational level.
What broader questions about art does the book raise?
Beyond the make-believe analogy itself, the book raises questions about what point of view means in the arts, what it means for one work to be more realistic than another, and how emotional responses to fictional characters can be philosophically coherent. The publisher positions it as essential reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art, reflecting just how broadly Walton casts the theoretical net.
Sources & Further Reading
The key facts and claims in this review are grounded in the retrieved, verified sources listed below.
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hup.harvard.edu
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firstpersonscholar.com
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